The Cultural Dynamics of Power and Corruption in Local Government Department, District Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
Abstract
The purpose of the study is to explore the cultural dynamics and patterns of misuse of authority in the local government department at the district Swabi, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The main focus of the study is to identify that who are the real stakeholders holding the power in the local government department, how corruption is done by these powerful stakeholders, what are the patterns of power execution and what are the implications of the misuse of authority for the local communities. The study is based on the social exchange theory of anthropology. The study is qualitative in nature. Purposive and snowball sampling methods are used. The minimum sample size is 270 and the maximum sample size is indefinite and depends on the saturation of the same frequent information. Data is collected via unstructured interviews and case studies. The major finding of the study is that there exists an informal network of liaison among the three actors, holding and sharing the power and authority as partners, in the local government. The three actors working as partners in this liaison were identified as: the local government officials, the local community leaders, and the government contractors. This informal network of liaisons is holding and sharing the power and authority to obtain, maintain and secure social, political, and monetary benefits. This liaison has established an informal system of power and authority that is exercised through its own informal structure. This informal system is working parallel to the formal legal system of the government. The Laws, regulations, rules, and procedures set for the public administration and governance are used to be technically evaded and dodged by these partners to secure their vested interests. The vested interests were identified as: keeping control over the power and authority sources, misuse of authority to collect the wealth, and to buy the means of pleasures and luxuries. This informal power liaison seeks and secure support from the provincial and federal government authorities. This support is obtained via the payments of cash money, luxurious gifts, and services. This informal system of liaison always controls and obtains the awards of the contracts of the development and non-development works and services in the local government. They save illegal money in these contracts through various methods identified with the names as: the acceptances, the advances, the commissions, and the local taxations. The local communities are controlled and kept satisfied via the local touts. The loyalty of these touts is bought via the provision of government jobs, contracts of developmental works and services and payments of cash money. The local cultural patterns of interdependence and social exchanges based on kinship ties, neighborhoods, friendship, and political affiliations provide the ground for corruption.
References
Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: A survey. Economics Journal, 113, F632-F652.
Aidt, T. S. (2011). Corruption and sustainable development. In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. 2, 3-51. University of Cambridge.
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1996). The causes and consequences of corruption: A review of recent empirical contributions. IDS Bulletin, 27(2).
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1997). The new economics of corruption: A survey and some new results. Political Studies, XLV, 496–515.
Aluko, Y. A. (2009). Corruption in Nigeria: Concept and Demission in Anti- Corruption Reforms in Nigeria since 1999: Issues, challenges and the way forward. IFRA Special Resources Issues, 3.
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320-1346.
Bozeman, B., Molina, A. L., & Kaufmann, W. (2018). Angling for sharks, not pilot fish: Deep corruption, venal corruption, and public values failure. Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 1, 5–27.
Chêne, M. (2008). Overview of corruption in Pakistan. Transparency International, 1-13.
David, I. O. (2012). Corruption: Definitions, Theories and Concepts. Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter), 24, 37.
Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (1997). The resources of corruption: Some reflections from the Italian Case. Crime, Law and Social Change, 27, 231–254.
Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (1999). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
De Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2010). Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth. Review of Development Economics, 15, 108-123.
Doig, A. (2014). Roadworks ahead? Addressing fraud, corruption and conflict of interest in English local government. Local Government Studies, 40, 670–686.
Doig, A., & Theobald, R. (Ed.) (2000). Corruption and democratization. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Dowley, K. M. (2006). Local government transparency in East Central Europe. Local Government Studies, 32, 563–583.
Froystad, M., Heggstad, K.K., & Fjeldstad, O-H. (2010). Linking procurement and political economy. Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Goran, H., Julius, C., & Ken, M. (2003). The Bureaucracy and governance in 16 developing countries. Overseas Development Institute, World Governance Survey Discussion, 7.
Gould, J., & Kolb, W. L. (Eds.). (1964). A Dictionary of social science. Macmillan Publisher, New York.
Graaf, G. De. (2007). Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption. Public Administration Quarterly, 31, 39–86.
Graaf, G. de, & Huberts, L. W. J. C. (2008). Portraying the nature of corruption: Using an explorative case-study design. Public Administration Review, 68, 640-653.
Graycar, A. (2015). Corruption: Classification and analysis. Policy and Society, 34, 87–96.
Haque, M. S. (1997). Incongruity between bureaucracy and society in developing nations: A critique. Peace and Change, 22(4), 432-462.
Harstad, B., & Svensson, J. (2011). Bribes, lobbying, and development. American Political Science Review, 105(1), 46-63.
Heidenheimer, A. J., et al. (1989). Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444, Washington: World Bank.
Hill, D. M. (1974). Decentralization Theory and Local Government. London: Allen and Unwin.
Huntington, S. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven,NJ. Yale University Press.
Jain, A.K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71-116.
Jancsics, D., & Jávor, I. (2012). Corrupt governmental networks. International Public Management Journal, 15, 62–99.
Javaid, U. (2010). Corruption and Its deep impact on good governance in Pakistan. Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 123-134.
Jiménez, F., Garcı́a-Quesada, M., & Villoria, M. (2014). Integrity systems, values, and expectations: Explaining differences in the extent of corruption in three Spanish Local Governments. International Journal of Public Administration, 37, 67–82.
Johnston, M. (1997). Public officials, private interests, and sustainable democracy: When politics and corruption meet. In Corruption and the Global Economy, ed. by Kimberly Ann Elliott Washington: Institute for International Economics), 61-82.
Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of corruption: wealth, power, and democracy. New York, NY. Cambridge University Press.
Kaufmann, Daniel, A. Kraay, and P. Zoido. (1999). Governance matters. Washington: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196.
Kaufmann, Daniel, & Siegelbaum, P. (1996). Privatization and corruption in the transition economies. Journal of International Affairs, 50, 1–31.
Kawata, J. (Ed) (2006). Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism. London, Ashgate.
Khan. F. (2007). Corruption and the decline of the state in Pakistan. Asian Journal of Political Science, 15(2), 219-247.
Kopits, G., and Craig, J. D. (1998). . In Transparency in Government Operations. International Monetary Fund (IMF Occasional Paper No. 158, Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Lawal, G. (2007). Corruption and development in Africa: Challenges for political and economic change. Humanity and Social Sciences Journal, 2(1), 1-7.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (1999). Corruption in empirical research-a review. Transparency International, processed.
Larmour, P. (2012). Corruption and the concept of culture: Evidence from the Pacific Islands. Corruption,49(3), 155.
Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. Economics & Politics, 17, 559–576.
Leff, N. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8-14.
Lockard, D. (1963). The Politics of State and Local Government. Macmillian first edition.
Marshall, A. (1965). Local government in modern world. Stamp Memorial Lecture.The Athlone Press.
Masters, A. B., & Graycar, A. (2016). Making corruption disappear in local government. Public Integrity, 18(1), 42-58.
Méon, P. G., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth. Public Choice, 122, 69–97.
Meyer-Sahling, J.-H., Mikkelsen, K. S., & Schuster, C. (2018). Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don’t. Public Administration, 96, 276-285.
Meza, O., & Pérez-Chiqués, E. (2021). Corruption consolidation in local governments: A grounded analytical framework. Public Administration, 99(3), 530-546.
Montinola, G., Jackman, R. (2002). Sources of corruption: A cross-national study. British Journal of Political Science, 32, 147–170.
NRO Pakistan 2007: https://shorturl.at/ht356; relevant sections include section 2. Amendment of section 494, Act V of 1989).
Olver, C. (2018). Patronage and politics in a South African city: A case study of Nelson Mandela Bay. Area Development and Policy, 3, 275–292.
Pashev, K. (2009). Reducing corruption risks and practices in public procurement: Evidence from Bulgaria. First Global Dialogue on Ethical and Effective Governance (Amsterdam, 2009).
Pena Ló pez, J. A., & Sánchez Santos, J. M. (2014). Does corruption have social roots? The role of culture and social capital. Journal of Business Ethics, 122, 697-708.
Pianezzi, D., & Grossi, G. (2020). Corruption in migration management: A network perspective. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 86(1), 152-168.
Plaček, M., Pů ček, M., & Ochrana, F. (2018). Identifying corruption risk: A comparison of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21, 366-384.
Pope, J. (1995). Containing corruption in international transactions – The challenge of the 1990s. In Issues in Global Governance: Papers written for the commission on global governance (67–90). London: Klewer Law International.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Causes, consequences, and reform, MA.: Cambridge University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2008). Corruption and government. Causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rose–Ackerman, S. (2008). Corruption and government. International Peacekeeping, 15(3), 328-343.
Scott, J. (1972).Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Shafqat, S. (1999). Pakistani bureaucracy: Crisis of governance and prospects of reform. The Pakistan Development Review, 995-1017.
Staats, S.J. (1972). “Corruption in the Soviet system” Problems of Communism, 21, 40.
Strach, P. , Sullivan, K., & Pérez-Chiqués, E. (2019). The garbage problem: Corruption, innovation, and capacity in four American cities, 1890–1940. Studies in American Political Development, 33, 209-233.
Tanzi, V. (1995). Corruption: Arm’s-length relationships and markets. In the economics of organised crime, eds. G. Fiorentini and S.M.
Pelzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope, and cures. Staff papers,45(4), 559-594.
Torsello, D., Venard, B. (2016). The anthropology of corruption. Journal of Management Inquiry, 25(1), pp. 34-54.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
